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The purpose of this article is to shed light on the relation between large and small 
member states with regard to the majority principle. Since Maastricht at the latest the 
institutional discussion centers around the question of how to devise a decision 
system which pays equal attention to the interests of small and large states in the 
European Union. This article challenges several underlying assumptions: that size is 
an important factor determining the political clout of a member state; the existence of 
‘natural’ interest divergences and the competitive nature of the European politiy. 
Finally, it questions the intrinsic relation between majority voting and democracy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Declaration of Laeken from 15 December 2001 states that European citizens are 
calling for “a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, 
developing a Europe which points the way ahead for the world” (2001: 3). What they 
got from the Convention about the Future of Europe
2 is an extension of the qualified 
majority procedure in the Council of the European Union based on a system of double 
majority: for the adoption of decisions “a majority shall consist of the majority of 
member states, representing at least three fifths of the population of the Union” 
(Art.24.1). During the nocturnal negotiations of Nice this model was rejected by a 
large number of member states whereas a new weighting of votes, as foreseen in the 
Amsterdam protocol, was favoured vehemently by France. The outcome of Nice was 
best described by Commission President Romano Prodi’s comment that the system 
will work but “is not understandable” (Agence Europe, 12 December 2000: 1). But 
this system, which will remain the foundation of the European decision-making 
process until 2009, was regarded as insufficient by the Convention following the 
wide-spread belief that Europe’s institutional arrangement needs to be more efficient 
because of the ‘looming’ enlargement of ten new member states. 
 
Since Maastricht at the latest the scepticism of the small member states towards the 
institutional reform suggestions of the large ones is visible.
3 These  reforms  were 
understood as direct attacks against the sacrosanct principle of equality even if the 
political practice, i.e. the weighting of votes in the Council, for a long time already 
compromised the equality of the member states. So, it could be expected that once the 
Convention came to an end, the system of double majority voting so much favoured 
by Germany and France would meet resistance from the states who regard it as a 
gross disadvantage for them. It was impossible to resolve the impasse during the 
Italian presidency in the second half of 2003 and it remains to be seen if the Irish will 
be more successful. The reform of the Commission, i.e. the reduction of the number 
of Commissioners, the introduction of a permanent Council President and the 
extension of qualified majority voting, contribute towards the small states’ worries 
                                                             
2 Henceforth Convention. 
3 See e.g. the memorandum of the Benelux countries at the Lisbon Council, Agence Europe, 20 June 
1992.   3
about the emergence of a directorate of big states. This interpretation seems to be 
based on several misunderstandings: 
 
•  Size matters 
A causal connection exists between the size of a country and its influence on 
the European policy-making process. Every institutional and procedural 
reform has to follow the “Brittan-doctrine”: “stopping the big fish from eating 
the small fry, and preventing the small fry from ganging up on the big fish” 
(Brittan 1994: 232). 
 
•  ‘Natural’ interest divergence 
Between rich and poor, old and new, northern and southern, transatlantic and 
European oriented, fiscally prudent and imprudent member states exist 
enormous interest divergences. The application of the majority principle 
secures the rationality of the decision, only permanent minorities have to be 
avoided. 
 
•  Europe as competitive polity 
European decisions are majority decisions which are the result of tough 
bargaining between national positions where every party tries to secure its 
benefit at the cost of others. Only the majority principle saves Europe from a 
new bout of Eurosclerosis á la seventies and eighties. It guarantees the 
effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making even in the face of ten new 
member states which still have to be ‘socialised’. 
 
•  Democracy is the rule of the majority 
Differentia specifica of democratic systems is the ultimate recourse to the 
principle of majority. It maximizes the number of people who exercise self-
determination and it guarantees the objective and moral righteousness of 
decisions. 
 
   4
Time and again these understandings have been proven empirically wrong. Their 
persistence nevertheless raises a series of questions connected to the understanding of 
democracy as majority rule. If the size of a country defines its interests and share of 
votes in a (supra-national) system of majority decisions in a competitive political 
environment, majority democracy runs into the danger of systematically disregarding 
the rights of smaller countries or infringing upon the interests of the big ones. These 
are exactly the arguments brought forward either to defend an extension of qualified 
majority voting or to condemn it.
4 But are they grounded in the empirical reality of 
European integration? 
 
Since we have to understand the majority concept as a procedure to reach decisions 
(and not as a basic democratic principle) we need to explore which conditions are 
favourable to its application and what are the dangers involved. The dangers were 
pointed out long ago by authors such as John Stuart Mill (1863) and Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1835) as well as by contemporary scholars like Giovanni Sartori (1987) 
and Robert Dahl (1971) warning of the oppression of minorities. Nevertheless, the 
majority rule is hailed as the only instrument which keeps the EU away from deadlock. 
The large member states in particular insist on the procedure of double majority but it 
seems that their claim is based on ideas which were formulated during the rise of the 
nation-state and which were dubious even for the so-called sovereign nation-state.  
 
From Jean-Jacques Rousseau onwards many political theorists have believed a 
homogenous citizenry to be a pre-condition for majority decisions.
5 It is the common 
collective identity which makes the minority accept the decisions of the majority
6, if 
this identity does not even guarantee unanimity.
7 A condition which, if it was ever 
true, does certainly not apply to modern fragmented societies characterized by social 
                                                             
4 This cleavage was also visible in the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Franco-German paper 
in January 2003 sparked furious responses by the representatives of small states in the plenary 
especially on the plans for a long-term presidency of the European Council.  
5 See especially Ch.2 of Book IV. in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Discourse 1762. 
Aristotle emphasized the importance of homonoia and philia politike as a pre-condition for reaching 
happiness which can only be achieved within a polity which necessarily has to be manageable. See, 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, esp. Book X.; Richard Klonoski (1996). 
6 The majority principle was emphasized by the so-called contract theory: see John Locke, The Second 
Treatise of Government, § 97, Rousseau, Contrat Social, Book II, 3 and 4. 
7 This line of argument was taken up by parts of the German “Staatsrechtslehre”. See Paul Kirchhof 
(1995, 2001), Dieter Grimm (1995, 1999), Stephan Hobe (2003).   5
mobility and the plurality of indvidual eudaimoniai.
8 The fragmentation of societies 
and the process of European integration which severely affects the traditional 
democratic arrangements built for the nation-state together constitute the major 
challenge for democracy. In the last years democratic theory has focused on questions 
of rational decision-making (Sen 1999; Barry 1970), the relation between markets and 
democracy (Beetham 1993; Wainwright 1994), democracy and difference (Young 
1992; Kymlicka 1995; Phillips 1994, 1995; Mills 1997, Taylor 1998), new forms of 
participation (Barber 1984; Hirst 1994; Parry/Moyser 1994), deliberation (Manin 
1987; Cohen 1989; Dryzeck 1990, 2000; Fishkin 1992; Blaug 1996; Bohman/Rehg 
1997; Elster 1998) and the future of democracy under the conditions of radical 
technical and social change (Bobbio 1987; Mouffe 1988, 1993; Trend 1996; 
Hague/Loader 1999). Systematic studies on democracy under the conditions of 
supranational integration are still the exception (Weiler 1995; Curtin 1997; Abromeit 
1998; Jachtenfuchs 1998; Lord 1998; Greven/Pauly 2000; Warleigh 2003) in the huge 
body of literature on European integration. But it is the process of integration which 
makes the reassessment of key concepts like majority-rule necessary because we can 
hardly expect a system which was developed under Roman Law (Bobbio 1981; 
Gierke 1984; Simmel 1984), and subsequently tied to the nation-state, to work in a 
totally different setting like the EU. This assumption rests on a rejection of a 
Straussian (or Hegelian) view of history which assumes a catalogue of eternal 
questions without taking into account that these very questions (and not only the 
answers) change depending on specific-socio-political conditions, thus making a 
simple transfer of one set of answers to a different set of questions unpromising at 
best. We have to bear in mind Norberto Bobbio’s words (1987: 37) that “the project 
of political democracy was conceived for a society much less complex than the one 
that exists today.” 
 
In order to shed some light on the aforementioned questions we first need to ask if 
there really exists a cleavage based on size between the member states. Section 2 
deals with various political science approaches to differentiate between large and 
small member states as well as with the question of whether EU member states have 
divergent interests. The following part focuses on the decision practice in the Council 
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of the EU; the central institution always scolded for being secretive and undemocratic. 
Section 4 questions the intrinsic relation between democracy and the majority 
principle. Apart from presenting some conclusions, the final section follows good 






The interest scholars have taken in problems resulting from the size of states with 
regard to international relations in general has so far had little reverberations in the 
studies on European integration. The issue has only gained some relevance in the 
course of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) leading to the Treaty of Nice 
(Bond/Feus 2001). Unsurprisingly, the row about small and big broke out rather 
vehemently, with the main bone of contention being the voting weights of the 
members in the Council of the EU in view of the next enlargement. A row which was 
continued in the constitutional Convention where the division between big and small 
states was again visible (Norman 2003). But we have to take the specific nature of 
IGCs into account: they generally lead to new institutional arrangements and thus are 
of constitutional importance. IGCs are about a new balance of power between the 
European institutions as well as between the member states. Hence, scholarly 
judgements and insights cannot easily be transposed onto the everyday policy-making 
process. Moreover, the picture might change from one policy field to another, if not in 
principle, certainly in important details. 
 
In the literature on International Relations several attempts have been made for a 
quantitative approach aiming at the definition of small states. Perhaps the most 
extensive analysis is the UNITARY-study “Small States and Territories: States and 
Problems” (Rapaport et al. 1971) which measures size by three variables: area, 
population and Gross National Product (GNP). But the definition of the size of states 
can also be undertaken by measuring their potential influence, which also uses to 
some extent quantitative variables. Robert O. Keohane (1969) distinguishes small and 
big by focusing on whether their leaders think their states have a decisive impact on 
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the international system. Others have defined a small state as being unable to exercise 
its political will, or protect its interests, by power politics (Jaquet 1971) or as a state 
that does not have the capabilities to guarantee its own security (Rothstein 1968). It 
was also argued that it is not possible to arrive at more specific definitions. Quite 
logically, but nevertheless hardly original, some of the literature contends that “the 
idea of small power is meaningless unless used relative to other states” (Bjol 1971). 
 
Whereas the economic literature focuses on the expected characteristics of the states’ 
economies, “the political literature takes as a starting point that a small state has a 
larger security problem and proceeds to examine the various available solutions” 
(Griffith/Pharo 1995: 29). The question of whether smaller states are able to influence 
larger states by forming alliances is a widely discussed issue. When theories have 
dealt with smaller states by “studying foreign policy the highest priority has been 
given to the study of the adaptive policy of small states in regard to the power politics 
of superpowers, or ‘big’ powers, and not to the participation of small states in 
integration processes. Thus, there is a special need for attention to the relationship 
between small states and integration.” (Kelstrup 1993: 137).  
 
A more recent study (Thorhallsson 2000) applies Peter J. Katzenstein’s approach 
based on the economic characteristics small states have in common with regard to 
European integration. Peter Katzenstein’s basic assumption is that “size affects, in 
particular, both economic openness and the characteristics of the political regime” 
(1985: 80). He discerns three distinctive characteristics of the smaller states in Europe. 
Firstly, smaller states can be distinguished from larger ones in their economic 
openness which reinforces their corporatist arrangements. Secondly, the corporatist 
difference is evident in the three defining characteristics of corporatism: “an ideology 
of social partnership, a centralized and contested system of economic interest groups, 
an uninterrupted process of bargaining among all of the major political actors across 
different sectors of policy” (Katzenstein 1985: 80). And thirdly, corporatism also 
results from the distinctive party systems of the small states in Europe, where 
“political opponents tend to share power and jointly influence policy” (Katzenstein 
1985: 80). Peter Katzenstein’s hypotheses are supported by the findings of Arend 
Lijphart (1999: 177) on interest group pluralism. His aggregated data shows a 
significant preference for corporatist structures in small states. It can be concluded   8
that small states indeed have, besides mere quantitative restrictions, different styles of 
policy-making compared to large states. However, this does not automatically mean 
that they have the same range of interests. 
 
By applying and refining Katzenstein’s approach, Baldur Thorhallsson (2000: 12) 
reaches the following conclusions for the policy fields ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ 
(CAP) and ‘Regional Policy of the EU’: Smaller states prioritize within these policy 
fields—they concentrate only on issues from which they gain considerable benefits in 
order to optimize the use of their personnel resources. The administrative working of 
the smaller states in the decision-making in CAP and in Regional Policy is 
characterized by greater informality and flexibility compared to the more formalized 
relations of the bigger member states. In questions of low relevance they have more 
room to maneuver. Size obviously also affects the relationship between the member 
states and the European Commission: The larger states are able to exert a stronger 
influence upon the Commission. The smaller states compensate for this by using the 
characteristics of their small administrations to develop a special relationship with 
officials of the Commission. Secondly, due to the limited capacity of the 
administrations of the smaller states, they rely more upon the Commission to get their 
proposals through the Council. Concerning the negotiation style, Baldur 
Thorhallsson’s study has shown that the distinctive corporatism of Peter Katzenstein’s 
theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the behavior of small states in 
the decision-making process of the CAP and the Regional Policy. This may be 
because in negotiations larger states are as restricted by their domestic interests as the 
smaller states. However, size does not seem to be a determining factor of state 
influence at the European level.  
 
 
III. The EU as competitive polity 
 
The most important decision-making body apart from the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives is the Council of the European Union. Qualified majority voting is 
the exception, the principle of mufakat (Haas 1973), i.e. the principle of unanimity 
built through discussion rather than voting. Besides the formal allocation of weighted 
votes, all states try to increase their power in the Council. It is tricky, though, to   9
establish what endows particular participants with effective power. Much attention 
has been given to states’ relative voting power (Hosli 1994; Widgrén 1994). The 
Banzhaf power index and the Shapley-Shubik power index both show similar results: 
a relative decline in the voting power of larger member states and a relative increase 
in the voting power of smaller member states. But small member states do not 
actually outvote large member states in any systematic way. When votes are taken, it 
is almost unheard of for two large member states to be outvoted. On unanimity 
decisions it is exceptional for a single small member to sustain opposition and highly 
exceptional for a small member state to attempt a veto on decisions otherwise subject 
to majority voting (comp. Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace: 268). Various coalitions are very 
common while long-term stable alignments are almost never seen.
10 Moreover, the 
fact that the EU deals simultaneously in so many policy areas makes it possible in 
principle for negotiations to embrace a wide variety of topics and thus be subject to 
cross-trading (Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 1997: 18). 
 
The large majority of decisions are not taken in the Council, but in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives known by its acronym Coreper. Only a small number of 
contested topics are handed to the Council as the so called “B-points”. Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 40) estimate that 85-90% of the decisions in the Council 
are based on the “A-points”, i.e. points where agreement has already been reached 
previously either in Committees and working groups (70%) or the Coreper (15-20%). 
This leaves 10-15% for the ministers in the Council where they actually have to 
decide. The decision-making style in the working groups and the Coreper is 
characterised by a “shared commitment to finding solutions” (Lewis 1998: 479), a 
common socialisation and devotion to European ideals, a dynamic process of 
l’engrenage and a culture of compromise. It is the Coreper which serves as a role 
                                                             
10 With the exception of the alliance between the Benelux countries which is explicitly referred to in 
Article 233 TEU. The most visible alliance in former times has been the Franco-German axis. In both 
cases the cooperation has been more concerned with the overall development of the EU rather than 
with specific policies, and both alliances have come under considerable strain in recent time. A new 
initiative calling for greater cooperation between the Nordic states is the Northern Dimension Initiative 
launched in 1997 by Finland (see Arter 2000) and the so-called Strategic partnership between Austria 
and some of the new member states – an initiative which can be considered as dead on arrival since 
very soon these states told Austria that they conceive a certain inconsistency between Austria initiating 
this partnership and Austria, at the same time, strongly arguing for transition periods in e.g. the labour 
market.   10
model for solution-oriented European decision-making. The size of the respective 
member state does not play a role.  
 
By way of conclusion we can say that the ability of a state to influence its 
environment within the framework of the EU largely depends on a favorable 
constellation of circumstances. Recognizing the right moment for launching an 
initiative or knowing when to put the brakes on depends on competent pundits 
informing their respective capitals about important trends. Sometimes this can amount 
to a situation of mutual siege—but s/he who is the first to grab the initiative is also the 
one to gain the most. Winning and blocking coalitions in the Council is typically 
constructed by the convergence of short and medium-term interests, not primarily to 
attain a specific voting threshold. Everything depends on making a proposition 
“yesable” to as many participants as possible (Fisher/Ury 1982). Alliances do not 
exist qua natural predispositions, but are formed due to converging and changing 
interests. Permanent minorities are thus avoided, and Madison’s principle of interest 
divergence as a safeguard for democracy works out at the European level: “Extend the 
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights 
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”(The 
Federalist No. 10, see also No. 51). Additionally, alliances might also be formed with 
the Commission and to an increasing degree with the factions of the European 
Parliament. Thus the size in terms of influence is a variable rather than a constant. 
 
Policy-making in the EU is dominated by the search for compromise. Even the 
constant extension of the areas where qualified majority voting applies since the 
Single European Act did not change that. The possibility to apply this QMV does not 
function as a decision principle, but rather like the sword of Damocles. It is beyond 
doubt that this sword helps to find compromise, which is itself a guarantee for 
minimum influence on the results. But is this sword the conditio sine qua non of 
democracy? 
 
   11
IV. Democracy and the ‘principle’ of majority 
 
There seems to reign a paradoxical relation between democracy and the majority 
principle. In theory, the majority rule tends to be regarded as the differentia specifica 
of democracy compared to other forms of rule. Hans Kelsen called the majority rule 
“the relatively closest approximation to the idea of liberty” (Kelsen 1929: 9) In 
practice, however, we find no democracies based on the strict application of majority 
rule. Even the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the archetypes of the Westminster 
model, deviate from majoritarian decision-making rules (see Lijphart et al. 1988: 12). 
There are innumerable arguments for and against the equalisation of democracy and 
majority rule. Thus, Robert Dahl (1989: 168) has his advocate of majoritarian 
democracy saying that “the problem of majority rule is a bog through which we could 
trudge until we are both exhausted.” 
 
The fear of the majority can be found in political philosophy for quite a time: it is 
shared by Alexis de Tocqueville (sections XV and XVI), John Stuart Mill (1991: 144), 
the authors of the Federalist (No. 10, 51) and Anti-Federalist papers (esp. the essays 
of ‘Brutus’), John Calhoun (1995) and many others. More specifically, for Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Joh Stuart Mill it is the fear of a spiritual tyranny of the majority 
which builds a wall around the thinking of the individual and constructs a suffocating 
social conformity. But these authors invoke the fear of absolute power and not the 
fear of a majority. In western-liberal societies we find the emphasis on free opinion 
and the plurality of media, the defense of the private sphere against state interference 
as countermeasures. The result is societies whose members enjoy a degree of freedom 
which was unthinkable just decades ago. There is hardly a combination of personal 
affections, political positions and activities which are not possible. But this is not 
what we mean by the concept of majority as a procedure (see Sartori 1987). This 
concept determines that political decisions have to be taken according to the will of 
the majority. Giovanni Sartori (1987: 221) points out “there are at least three 
magnitudes subsumed, often confusedly, under the majority rule heading: (a) qualified 
majorities (often a two thirds majority); (b) simpel or absolute majority (50.01 per 
cent); (c) relative majority, or plurality, that is, the major minority (a less than 50 per 
cent majority)”. He is undeniably right, but for the perceived minority (no matter if it 
is a big or small minority), it makes no difference which of the three magnitudes   12
applies. The crucial fact is that minority ideas about the ‘good life’, their eudaimoniai 
are not realized or even actively prevented. Their only protection is constitutional 
provisons shielding minority and opposition rights
11  and the existence of non-
majoritarian institutions which are indispensable for the functioning of democracy 
(Majone 1996, 1998).  
 
The alluring value of the equalisation of democracy and majority rule lies in the 
ostensible plausibility of the majority principle. Who would prima facie argue against 
Marquis de Condorcet’s proposition that “four eyes see more than two”? Who would 
doubt Kenneth May’s (1952) pleading for the decisiveness, neutrality, responsiveness, 
anonymity and fairness of majority decisions? Who would question the obvious fact 
that majority rules allow the greatest number of people to enjoy maximum freedom 
and, moreover, that it is tremendously efficient compared to other procedures? But a 
more detailed analysis shows that this plausibility is deceptive (see the excellent 
article by Risse 2004; see also e.g. Riker 1982). 
 
The conditions for the use of majority voting are very restrictive and only arise in 
exceptional circumstances. Very seldom do we have to choose between merely two 
alternatives. Modern societies are not only characterised by complex problems but 
also by complex solutions.
12  Even incremental solutions, e.g. the dissection of 
situations into pairwise votes, can lead to decision dominated by a tiny minority 
(Condorcet Paradox, see e.g. Jones et al. 1995; Kurrlid-Klitgaard 2001). Moreover, 
collective decisions are not only taken by the ranking of options. Also, the intensity of 
the preferences has to be taken into account. We may be willing to select the president 
of the European Political Science Association by majority, but not to apply the same 
rule to the question of whether the EU is an international organisation, a state-in-the-
making or a suis generis system. Existing information asymmetries add to the doubts 
about the fairness of majority decisions since it infringes on the basic democratic 
principle of equality. 
 
                                                             
11 The institutional answer also includes e.g. a proportional election system. See Nohlen (1996). 
12 A fact also recognized in the Napolitano Report (EP 2001, p.11): “the institutions of representative 
democracy are going through a phase of serious difficulty … for reasons that are linked not only to the 
peculiarities of European integration . but also to profound changes in our societies.”   13
Political theory has camouflaged the conflict between theory and practice in a twofold 
way. First, by pointing out that majority rule does not mean that this majority “would 
or should do anything it felt an impulse to do.” (Dahl 1956: 36). In addition to the 
above mentioned constitutional restraints there are more informal, ethical and cultural 
restraints. Now, this seems a little bit inconsequential if we refer to the majority 
principle as a last resort which will only be used in exceptionally tense times. To rely 
on informal safeguards in times of crisis requires a lot of benevolence and has hardly 
worked in Western societies in the first half of the 20
th century. Second, political 
theory has redicovered the discursive qualities of democracy. The basic asumption of 
the deliberative theory of democracy takes up John Dewey’s insight that even the rule 
of the greater part “is never merely majority rule [because] counting of heads compels 
prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion.” (Dewey 1927: 
207).
13  Deliberation allows for the exchange of rational
14  arguments. It is not the 
normative power of the actual but the rationality of arguments and their acceptance 
beyond ideological standpoints and political power, as well as the possibility of 
learning which guide deliberation. It is the chance for discursive exchange which 
guarantees the acceptance of the final outcome since we must not forget that at the 
end even deliberationists have to decide (Saward 2000). Only in exceptional cases 
will the deliberative process lead to a unanimous consensus. Has the majority 
principle now sneaked in through the backdoor again? The existence of radical and 
persistent contentions or Rawlsian dilemmas render consenus a rather unlikely 
outcome – no matter how long we deliberate. The solution is not the search for 
consensus but for compromise or “incompletely theorized arguments” (Sunstein 
1997). Consensus requires the abandonment or the overlapping of ideological 
positions. The deliberation process uncovers solutions which are acceptable for 
participants. This solution might lie in the intersection of ideologies, and is thus based 
on the relative proximity of the standpoints. Solutions which were not already – at 
least in principle – existent in the political world view of a participating faction are 
excluded. On the other hand, compromise is the agreement on a solution which allows 
                                                             
13 The now famous quotation from Pericles Funderal Speech “Our constitution … is called a 
democracy because power is in the hands not of minority but of the greatest number.” at the very 
beginning of the Draft Constitution seems to be an unhappy choice. Given the virtues of deliberation it 
might have been better to read to the end of Perciles’ speech where he says: “…instead of looking on 
discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any 
wise action at all.” (Thucydides, The History of the Peloponesian War, II. Book).   14
staying by one’s ideological positions. A compromise is not the result of preference 
changes but the belief in the obligation to find solutions to save the polity from total 
breakdown. Ankersmit (2002: 143) emphasized the paradoxical character of 
compromise: “on the one hand, as in the case of consensus, one stand’s by one’s 
ideological conviction, but, on the other hand, one is prepared to follow a line of 
political action more or less inimical to that conviction.” 
 
Thus, the equalisation of democracy with majority rule only makes limited sense. We 
should also take other characteristics of democracy seriously. Herfried Münkler 
(1995), for instance, has pointed to the fact that democracies vary from other forms of 
rule when it comes to the visibility and visualisation of power. Democracies very 
seldom erect monuments for their political leaders; despotism lives on the visibility of 
power, military as well as civil power. In terms of visibility, democracies accentuate 
the transparency of procedures whereas other regimes tend to keep the decision 
system in the dark. Other facets like the right to appeal and the constitutionality of 
laws remind one of the ever provisional character of democratic decisions as long as 
they stay within the constitutional framework.  
 
Philia politike, the ancient Greek concept of “political friendship” or solidarity, is less 
necessary for the acceptance of majority decisions but is a condition for the 
intelligible participation in the deliberative process. Acceptance of a decision is also 
based on the legality and legitimacy of the political process as well as on its 
‘retracability’.
15  The quest for more transparency at the European level is the 
expression of this understanding. Thus, the variety of negotiation levels and forums, 
of working groups and committees,
16  is not the manifestation of an undemocratic 
system but rather the only possibility to allow for the search for compromise – 
compromise instead of majority decisions (see also Neyer 2004). It is in the small 
working groups where trust and mutual understanding can be built and thus recourse 
to majority voting is unneeded. The rooms for deliberation and decision at the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 It seems important to me also to include irrational arguments because the “refinement of sentiments” 
(msdison, Federalist No. 10) through the character of public exchange is a doubtful safeguard. 
15 This was emphasized by the Committee of Independent Experts’ first report (On Allegations of 
Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, 15.3.1999) “The principles of 
openness, transparency and accountability … are at the heart of democracy and are the very 
instruments allowing it to function properly. Openness and transparency imply that the decision-
making process, at all levels, is as accessible and accountable as possible to the general public.”   15
European level are identical but hardly transparent.
17 This elite deliberation happens 
at the expense of democratic accountability and representativity. The antagonism 
between transparency, accountabilty and representativity and the maze of European 
decision-making seems to be the price for European compromise democracy. But as a 





The political practices in the Council of the EU and the Coreper clearly show that 
majority decisions are the exception and not the rule. So far, Europe follows the 
experiences of the national political systems: compromise and not consensus 
dominates the daily political life of Europe. The position of the member states is not 
dependent on their size, but largely influenced by their ability to form alliances and 
forge compromises. It is beyond doubt that there exists a lot of interest divergence 
between the member states of the Union. This divergence is the result of a multitude 
of factors: policy-styles and policy-profiles, constitutional history, economic structure, 
welfare systems
18 etc. A permanent cleavage running along the line of size in terms of 
area, population and GNP cannot be discerned. Rather, short- and mid-term alliances 
and immediate political concerns dominate supra-national policy-making. These 
alliances hardly follow the logic of quantitative variables. There is as much agreement 
between France and Germany as between France and Slovenia. It seems that the 
practice of decision-making in the Union follows the assumptions of deliberative 
theory whereas political rhetoric applies the theory of majoritarian democracy.  
 
The German and French insistence on the principle of double majority can be 
interpreted as the search for an ‘insurance’: the so far unique process of a “big bang” 
enlargement requires – according to some founding members – instruments which 
safeguard the European political system from deadlock. This is aggravated by the fact 
that towards the new member states a certain – not always understandable – 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 What Joseph Weiler (1998) called the “underworld” of the European system. 
17 Whereas these rooms where not identical in the case of the Convention: the body set up for 
deliberation was not the same body who was able to take decisions. Thus, a change of art. 48 TEU 
should urgently be considered.   16
skepticism reigns. Building trust, which is the necessary requirement for the search 
for compromise, takes time.
19 Hundreds of working groups and committees in the EU 
system allow for this trust to develop. The downside of this maze is a striking lack of 
transparency and accountability which contributes to the already profound alienation 
of citizens from their representatives. Strengthening the control rights of the European 
Parliament as well as the scrutinzing powers of national parliaments seems to be the 
right way to combine the virtues of expert deliberation and accountability.  
 
This negotiation or policy style is also an important characteristic differentiating the 
European political system from an international organisation. Whereas in the latter 
negotiations are often conducted as zero-sum games, the EU is characterized by the 
search for compromise. Due to the prominence of institutional questions during the 
debates regarding the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it is easy to get the impression that 
European politics is dominated by a quarrel between small and large member states. A 
closer look reveals the fact that even within these questions no permanent cleavages 
exist (see Puntscher Riekmann/Wessels 2004). Thus, the fear of the small member 
states is based on two misconceptions: (1) that there exists a natural alliance between 
the large member-states and (2) that the majority rule builds the normal decision-
making procedure. This is, vice versa, also true for the large member states who fear 
an ‘insurgence by the dwarfs”. 
 
When it comes to the theory of democracy, the challenge ahead lies in the lacking 
alignment between the rooms of deliberation and decision. The separation of these 
rooms was recently visible in the Constitutional Convention. It is beyond doubt that 
this Convention, compared to traditional IGCs, enjoyed a much higher degree of 
transparency, representatitivity and sometimes even efficiency.
20 But as long as there 
exists the possibility to pervert the results of public deliberation behind the closed 
doors of an IGC, this deliberation assumes the character and function of a buffer stop. 
The publics which are the source and reason for calling a system a democracy are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18 For an analysis of the impact of different political and constitutional traditions in the member states 
on their positions in the constitution debate see S. Puntscher Riekmann/W. Wessels (2004). 
19 French comments like the ones which could be heard during the Nice negotiations but also during the 
Iraq crises are not necessarily helpful to allow for trust building. 
20 But one has to bear in mind that the legitimacy of the Convention itself is rather doubtful since its 
members were not authorised by the people. This is one of the few similarities to the Philadelphia   17
blindfolded by a body which has no decisional powers. On the contrary, the daily 
decision-making of the Union is characterized by expert deliberation and decision but 
it suffers from a lack of transparency and a lack of accountability. Since we cannot 
expect the congruence of the two rooms of democracy – deliberation and decision – in 
the near future, the parliamentary control of the “underworld”, i.e. the working groups 
and committees, remains the yardstick by which to measure European democracy.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Convention. Another similarity seems to be that constitutional conventions have to overstep their 
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